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Abstract 
 
Government e-procurement initiatives have the potential to transform local institutions, but few 
studies have been published of strategies for implementing specific e-procurement tools, 
particularly involving procurement by a foreign government adapting to local culture in the 
Middle East/North Africa (MENA).  This case describes procurement at a forward operating 
base (FOB) in Kuwait in support of operations in Iraq. The government procurers had to deal 
with a phenomenon unique to the MENA region: wasta. Wasta is a form of social capital that 
bestows power, influence, and connection to those who possess it, similar to guanxi in China. 
This study explores the value proposition and limitations of electronic reverse auctions (eRA) 
with the purpose of sharing best practices and lessons learned for government procurement in 
a MENA country. The public value framework provides valuable theoretical insights for the 
implementation of a new government e-procurement tool in a foreign country. In a culture 
dominated by wasta, the suppliers enjoyed the transparency and merit-based virtues of eRA’s 
that transferred successfully into the new cultural milieu: potential to increase transparency, 
competition, efficiency, and taxpayer savings. The practices provided herein are designed 
specifically to help buyers overcome structural barriers including training, organizational 
inertia, and a lack of eRA policy and guidance while implementing a new e-procurement tool in 
a foreign country. 
 
Keywords: e-procurement, reverse auctions, electronic transactions, procurement innovation 
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Introduction 
 
Government e-procurement initiatives have 
the potential to transform local institutions, 
but few studies have been published of 
strategies for implementing specific e-
procurement tools. One procurement 
innovation receiving increased attention is 
the use of electronic reverse auctions (eRA). 
An eRA is, “an online, real-time dynamic 
auction between a buying organization and a 
group of… suppliers who compete against 
each other to win the business” (Beall, et al., 
2003, p.7). An eRA essentially works “like 
eBay in reverse” (FedBid, 2009), with 
multiple suppliers bidding down the amount 
they will charge a buyer for providing a good 
or service. The business case for eRA’s is 
compelling. Buyers typically save 5-40%, 
with an average of 20% (Cohn, 2000; Tully, 
2000; Rung, 2015) on the cost of goods and 
services by allowing multiple bids per 
offeror, versus the typical one-shot (or 
limited exchanges) currently used in 
government procurement. A recent study 
found net savings of 13% on $1.4 billion 
across five years of US Department of 
Defense spending, with 77% of dollars spent 
going to small businesses (Wyld, 2012). 
Other benefits include reduction of award 
cycle-time by up to 40% (Beall et al., 2003), 
increased bidding transparency, lower 
transaction costs, increased buyer’s reach, 
more efficient negotiations (Schoenherr, 
2008), increased buyer confidence in fair and 
reasonable prices (Hur,  et al., 2006), and 
higher price visibility (Kaufman & Carter, 
2004). Most relevant to the events described 
in this case, eRA’s provide an effective means 
to level the playing field for small businesses 
to compete against larger firms (Wyld, 2013). 
 
In this case study, the value proposition and 
limitations of eRA’s will be explored in the 
context of wasta, the Arabic social 
phenomenon, with the purpose of sharing 
best practices and lessons learned. Wasta is 
an embedded social networking 
phenomenon analogous to guanxi in Chinese 
culture, and like guanxi, its embedded nature 
forms an obstacle to foreign entities seeking 
to find and develop innovative sources of 
supply. In this case, eRA’s were used by a 
foreign buyer to rapidly expand a 
competitive supplier base in a way that 
boosted perceptions of procedural fairness 
and incentive to innovate. 
 
Despite the benefits, eRA adoption in the 
public sector considerably lags that of the 
for-profit sector. Lagging adoption is likely 
attributed to the lack of a profit motive, a lack 
of management leadership, and the perceived 
risk of a bid protest (Hawkins et al., 2010a). 
This case overcame all these obstacles, 
focusing on the innovative aspects of eRA 
adoption as a means of addressing national 
and organizational culture complexities, how 
one agency overcame multiple obstacles to 
generate impressive results, and the 
implications of that success for the overall 
progress of this technique in public sector 
procurement. This research contributes to 
the nascent literature assessing how to 
institutionalize a public e-procurement 
system in a developing country (Wahid and 
Sein, 2013), as well as to the body of research 
documenting the human factor in successful 
implementation of government e-
procurement systems (Aman and Kasimin, 
2011; Rana, et al., 2013), demonstrating how 
e-government has the potential to play an 
important role in developing country 
economic competitiveness (Omur, et al., 
2009). The presented case also demonstrates 
the power of transparency and right-to-
access government information as 
transformative in an emerging economy 
(Bertot, et al., 2012). 
 
The remainder of this case is organized as 
follows. First, the background of national and 
organizational cultural complexities is 
presented, followed by a history of eRA 
evolution. Next, public value theory (Moore, 
2000) is presented as a basis for strategizing 
innovating in government procurement. We 
extend public value theory with Rogers’s 
(2010) work on diffusion of innovation; its 
focus on cultural resistance provides an 
3                                                                                                     The MENA Journal of Business Case Studies 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________ 
 
Timothy G. Hawkins and Michael J. Gravier (2016), The MENA Journal of Business Case Studies,  
DOI: 10.5171/2016.191667 
 
important counterpoint to the strategic 
imperative of public value theory. 
Afterwards, the case scenario is described 
along with two implementation tools 
relevant to innovative public procurement 
managers: the eRA appropriateness construct 
for justifying eRA use and success, and a 
primer for integrating eRA’s into a common 
situation: the multi-attribute sourcing 
process. Next, risks, challenges, issues, and 
obstacles are discussed, followed by a set of 
best practices and lessons learned. The case 
concludes with discussions about innovating 
in the international arena. 
 
Background 
 
Kuwait represents a progressive country for 
e-government implementation in the MENA 
region, currently ranking #7 among Asian 
countries for e-government (United Nations, 
2012). Western Asia overall is above the 
world’s average, and Kuwait is ranked #63 
out of 190 countries. Kuwait’s global ranking 
has dropped slightly from previous years; it 
ranked #50 in 2010, and #57 in 2008 (United 
Nations, 2010; United Nations, 2008). This is 
a reflection of the major improvement by 
other countries in the region. 
 
This background provides the settings for the 
case and the evolution of eRA use. The 
context of the national and organizational 
cultures provides the backdrop for the 
innovation framework presented in the 
subsequent section. The evolution of eRA’s 
describes the growth of eRA’s prior to the 
events of the case, which was an important 
factor for convincing government leadership 
to allow its adoption as an innovative new 
procurement practice. 
 
National vs. Organizational Culture 
 
This case describes procurement at a 
forward operating base (FOB) in Kuwait in 
support of operations in Iraq. The 
government procurers had to deal with a 
phenomenon unique to the Arab-speaking 
world: wasta. Wasta is a form of social capital 
that bestows power, influence, and 
connection to those who possess it (El-Said & 
Harrigan, 2009). Analogous to guanxi in 
China or the legacy “old boy” network 
created by British boarding schools, wasta 
implies precedence of local social capital 
over organizational mission objectives. Like 
guanxi, wasta relies heavily on family 
connections. Wasta represents a social 
networking phenomenon with a long and 
important—yet seldom studied—history in 
the MENA region; this case study answers the 
call to document how Eastern cultures adapt 
Western business practices, as well as what 
Western managers can learn from Eastern 
traditions (Hutchings and Weir, 2006). This 
case presents the successful implementation 
of a new procurement practice (eRA’s) that 
conflicts with accepted business traditions in 
both Western and Eastern managerial 
traditions. 
 
The Arab-speaking world has grown in 
economic and political influence (Hutchings 
and Weir, 2006). The Arab World 
encompasses diversity comparable to 
Europe’s, with a range of annual per capita 
income from Qatar ($137,200) to Yemen 
($3,800), and a rich diversity of histories as 
ancient as Egypt’s Cairo to the modern 
skyscrapers of Dubai, yet Western managers 
tend to view the Arab World as 
homogeneous. Despite the many differences 
across countries in the Arab World, wasta 
pervades the region (Cunningham and 
Sarayrah, 1993). Often jokingly called 
“vitamin W”, it permeates all aspects of 
personal and business life in Arab countries, 
even though a survey in Jordan found 86% 
consider it a form of corruption that should 
be eliminated; nevertheless, 90% used wasta 
at least “sometimes” (Whitaker, 2009). In 
addition to being a long-standing social 
tradition, wasta persists in part because it 
can facilitate transactions from governments 
that are often inefficient and slow (Ma’ayeh, 
2011). 
 
Like guanxi, wasta has many positive social 
networking connotations concomitant with 
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negative corruption implications. Also like 
guanxi, the subtle social interconnectedness 
bewilders outsiders, especially Westerners. 
Wasta values connections—especially family 
connections— and seniority over 
performance or qualifications (Al Suleimany, 
2009). Transactions always occur embedded 
in the context of social formalities and 
exchange of favors over financial or other 
sorts of gains often valued by Westerners. 
Younger generations with more exposure to 
Western educational, political, and business 
ideals often criticize wasta harshly as corrupt 
(Ma’ayeh, 2011; Whitaker, 2009). The role 
and perception of wasta has changed 
drastically over time from a valued social 
transaction that tied together societies and 
mediated conflicts between groups to being 
often associated with securing government 
largesse and interceding to secure favors (Al 
Suleimany, 2009). Viewed as a whole, wasta 
embodies similar positives and negatives as 
other social networking phenomena across 
many cultures: guanxi in China, “old boy 
network” in the United Kingdom, blat in 
Russia, and Vetternwirtschaft in Germany. As 
in many countries, rapid cultural evolution 
has changed the perception and role of how 
social and business connections are 
managed. 
 
From the procurer’s perspective, primacy of 
social influence, power, and connections 
leads to excess transaction costs, stymies 
innovation, and often precludes opportunity. 
Most importantly, wasta deteriorates trust in 
the procurement system. Trust in a 
procurement system that offers fair 
opportunity rather than just reinforcing 
previously established marketing regimes is 
a requisite condition for foreign investment 
and economic development. This maxim 
extends beyond the MENA to other 
developing regions such as Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
 
Government procurers attempting to 
overcome the detrimental effects of wasta 
face a difficulty commonly faced by a foreign 
agency operating in another country: cultural 
resistance. Even when the outcomes greatly 
benefit locals, foreign organizations often fail 
to take time to appreciate the power of local 
cultural paradigms. In one documented case, 
a foreign worker utterly failed at teaching a 
Peruvian village to boil its water to kill 
pathogens (Rogers, 2010). The aid worker 
was “innovation-oriented”, relying on the 
presentation of scientific evidence about 
germs. With no basis for understanding germ 
theory, the poorest villagers instead focused 
on the motivations of the change agent, who 
as an outsider had earned no trust. As a 
result of her inability to communicate the 
value of boiling water in terms perceived as 
legitimate to the poorest villagers, they failed 
to adopt the change. 
 
Innovation of long-accepted practices is most 
of all a social process, requiring adoption by 
the right players for the right reasons. The 
change agent would have been better served 
by being “client-oriented” and gaining the 
support and legitimacy of the village opinion 
leaders, whose influence mattered much 
more to the villagers. 
 
Limited studies document the challenges of 
e-procurement implementation in 
governments, and extant research tends to 
focus on implementation and modernization 
issues rather than documenting how 
government e-procurement can be an active 
tool for engaging local cultural phenomena 
(c.f., Aman and Kasimin, 2011). One study of 
interest documented the power of engaging 
local “institutional entrepreneurs” in order to 
institutionalize a public e-procurement 
system in a developing country (Wahid and 
Sein, 2013). The study documented the case 
of a local champion or “change 
entrepreneur”—a city mayor—who 
championed the institutionalization of a new 
e-procurement system. The mayor initially 
focused on instilling the right values before 
achieving the goal of embedding the new e-
procurement system in local practices. These 
findings parallel the cultural challenges in the 
Peruvian village, but from the perspective of 
institutional theory. We present a case that 
addresses the implementation of a specific 
tool from a more strategic perspective by 
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using the public value framework (c.f., 
Moore, 2000). 
 
These findings are mirrored in our study. 
Organizational culture can present as many 
complexities as national culture. The 
procurement manager acting as a change 
agent in this case study had to confront 
organizational resistance to changing 
established procurement practices. Five 
years after the initial invasion of Iraq, 
routines for purchasing had been 
established. Government purchasing policy is 
generally based on the assumption that 
leveraging market power will maximize 
value at lowest cost. As in the case of the 
Peruvian villagers, military acquisitions 
managers—particularly those located at a 
well-established FOB—tend to resist 
procedural change that is perceived as 
unproven, or even unnecessary, unless a 
broader social context supports an 
innovation. The mantra, “If it ain’t broke, 
don’t fix it,” prevails, even when shown 
superior techniques from commercial 
industry. This is where strategic direction 
tends to break down, because arguments 
about the superior economic outcome 
(government savings) run into established 
norms. Similarly, logic was on the side of the 
public health workers in Peru, but it was no 
match for an entrenched belief system. 
 
While eRA adoption in the for-profit sector is 
ubiquitous, government adoption remains 
underwhelming (Hawkins, 2012). Absent a 
profit motive, government agencies are less 
excited about the prospect of savings. At the 
same time, government agencies often 
prioritize procurement lead time over results 
(Hawkins, 2012); whereas, initial eRA 
adoption can add lead time as new processes 
are developed and the services of a third-
party auctioneer are secured.  Government 
agencies are also afraid of receiving bid 
protests (Gordon, 2013), hampering 
innovative practices and risk-taking in 
procurement. Furthermore, agencies are 
reluctant to fuel a flame of political resistance 
from the small business community that, 
generally, opposes eRA’s usage; therefore, 
the absence of policy advocacy for eRA usage 
is not surprising. Agency managers rarely 
invite unwanted negative attention. For these 
reasons, adoption barriers for eRA’s in 
government are understandably steep. 
But winds of change were in the air. At the 
time of the case, less than a year had passed 
since publication of a Congressional Budget 
Office report that projected a conservative 
and incomplete cost of $1.2 to $1.7 trillion for 
the Iraqi War through 2017 (Orszag, 2007). 
Press allegations of corruption and poor 
fiscal oversight by military procurement 
managers dating back as far as 2004 
motivated a renewed call to control costs and 
innovate spending procedures. 
 
eRA Evolution 
 
Reverse auctions emerged as a procurement 
technique prior to the dot-com hype of e-
commerce. In traditional auctions, the seller 
initiates the auction, and bids increase the 
price for an item for sale so that the seller 
gets the most revenue. In reverse auctions, 
buyers initiate the auction, and various 
suppliers drive prices down so that the buyer 
gets the “best deal” (Fig. 1).  The idea of 
an auction is to create a situation where 
buyers and sellers can share perfect 
information about the product, the buyer’s 
needs, and the seller’s pricing (Smeltzer and 
Carr, 2002). Reverse auctions rely on the 
availability of several suppliers to compete, 
and “dynamic” pricing resulting from real-
time information sharing about the current 
lowest bid during the auction. Ideally, 
competition and open information balance 
supply and demand at a lower price in line 
with the seller’s profit margin rather than 
information asymmetry between the seller 
and buyer. 
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Figure 1: Sample Reverse Auction Bid History 
 
Previously, organizational buyers conducted 
reverse auction with suppliers in hotel 
meeting rooms, using flipcharts to record 
bids (Simchi-Levi,  et al., 2003). Reverse 
auction pioneer FreeMarkets Online was 
created when Kinney and Meakem left GE to 
start to take the sourcing process online, 
outsource some of the buyers’ procurement 
processes, and expand the scale of adoption. 
Applying the principle of minimum 
transactions, this newly invented channel for 
industrial buyers purported to 
disintermediate the supplier’s sales 
representative (and their associated 4-7% 
commission). FreeMarkets’ revenue model 
initially consisted of a per-bid-event fee to 
the buyer and a commission percentage of 
savings paid by the winning supplier. 
 
Today, there are approximately 50 
auctioneer suppliers of eRA auctioning 
services worldwide. In 2004, FreeMarkets 
was bought by an e-procurement leader, 
Ariba, who was bought by SAP in 2012. 
Revenue models also evolved into three fee 
structures: 1. The winning supplier paid a 
commission (% of buyer’s savings); 2. The 
buyer paid an annual fee for support of a 
predetermined number of bidding events; or, 
3. Do-it-yourself buyers pay a license fee to 
use the bidding software themselves. 
 
The results of the eRA evolution and 
innovation have been astounding. In 1998, 
they reported average transaction savings of 
15% (Simchi-Levi et al., 2003). Our own 
recent research of 146 eRA’s across a wide 
variety of industries, commodities and 
services, and volumes showed an average 
20% savings (Hawkins, et al., 2010b). These 
savings are derived from a buyer’s access to 
more suppliers, access to global suppliers, 
consolidated spending reaping economies of 
scale, lower supplier margins, substantially 
increased competition, and the buyer’s 
access to more information. 
The eRA provides a tool in the hands of the 
experienced purchasing manager that 
requires judicious application. As with any 
procurement tool, it can cause harm if 
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misapplied. Later in this case we present the 
eRA Appropriateness Model (Fig. 2) that 
procurement managers can use to evaluate 
the suitability of eRA for a specific purchase 
decision. 
 
Theoretical Foundation 
 
Developing a judicious approach to 
implementing an innovative procurement 
practice in a sensitive international setting 
benefits from a new framework and the 
development of a new theoretical construct. 
First public value theory is described as an 
important framework that relates for-profit 
to non-profit/governmental strategy making. 
This framework describes how public 
managers can successfully transfer private 
sector innovations to the public sector. 
Afterwards, consideration is given to 
theoretical underpinnings for determining 
eRA appropriateness as a useful construct to 
augment public value theory. 
 
Government Management for Value 
 
Managing for value, or the public value 
framework, has developed over the course of 
several decades starting in the early 1980s at 
Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of 
Governance. Mark Moore (2000) provides a 
comprehensive overview of the public value 
perspective of public management strategy. 
For-profit and government organizations 
both rely on three key dimensions of 
strategy: social value, financial performance, 
and organizational survival. For-profit 
organizations enjoy perfect alignment 
between these three dimensions. With 
financial performance defined by 
profitability, a company that provides a good 
or service at a profit has fulfilled its 
obligation for social value and assured 
organizational survival. 
 
Public organizations do have an alignment 
between financial performance and 
organizational survival since no organization 
outlives its fiscal constraints. On the other 
hand, public organizations differ in their 
source of revenue and how they measure 
value. Non-profit and government 
organizations have their social value defined 
by outside stakeholders. In the case of the 
government, a collective political process 
establishes a mission, which receives 
funding from mandatory taxes levied on 
the populace. Unlike a for-profit 
mission, which is free to change in 
order to follow profits, government 
missions demand concrete and specific 
goals with regard to the business in 
which they can engage. This can lead to 
the problem of “mission stickiness,” meaning 
that the organization remains committed to 
the mission even after the task environment 
changes. On the other hand, elected 
representatives constantly monitor for 
“mission creep” so that public managers 
remain focused on the mission for which 
their funds were appropriated. 
 
To balance these forces, the strategic triangle 
describes strategy in the public sector. The 
three points of the triangle are value, 
operational capacity, and legitimacy and 
support (Moore, 1995). Managers 
strategizing how to implement an innovation 
must first assess the value relative to the 
organization’s mission. Public managers 
must reconcile the reason for the 
organization’s existence with the proposed 
innovation’s claim to make the world better. 
Operational capacity refers to sufficient 
capability and knowledge to make the 
innovation doable. Legitimacy and support 
looks at the source of support for pursuing 
the value embodied by the innovation. The 
innovative manager cannot justify his 
innovation based on his own perceptions, but 
must convince the authorizing environment. 
In the government, the authorizing 
environment includes organizational 
managers and executives, in addition to 
citizens, elected representatives, interest 
groups, the media, and other stakeholders in 
the extended socio-political environment. 
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The implication of the strategic triangle is 
that public managers must focus as much on 
political as organizational management. By 
watching for events occurring in the political 
arena, a public manager may find the 
opportunity to justify an innovative new 
practice. The strategic triangle also implies 
that public managers must question and 
justify the effectiveness of innovations for 
achieving the organizational mission. By 
focusing on the issue of public value, the 
prospective public innovator can justify 
changes to established practice. 
 
eRA Appropriateness 
 
Complementing the strategic triangle, the 
eRA appropriateness construct identifies 
contextual circumstances where eRA use is 
more likely to lead to success of the auction 
(Hawkins, et al., 2009). Use of eRA 
appropriateness functions as a mechanism to 
demonstrate operational capacity in a way 
that justifies value; as a result, it also proves 
a useful tool for garnering legitimacy and 
support. In keeping with public value theory, 
the three points of the triangle are self-
reinforcing and interdependent. We define 
eRA appropriateness as the degree to which 
a sourcing professional views the use of an 
eRA as a fit between the attributes of the tool, 
the specific requirement being sourced, and 
the supply market. Determinants of eRA 
appropriateness include (Fig. 2): 
specifiability, competition, leadership 
influence, a price-based selection criterion 
(Hawkins et al., 2009), type of spend, 
expected savings, and attractiveness 
(purchase volume and excess capacity) 
(Hawkins, et al., 2010b).
 
 
Phase 1: Requirement Evaluation
Specifiability
• Leadership support
• Strong/close buyer-supplier 
relationship NOT required
• Requirement stable
• “Non-critical”/Leverage Spend
Phase 2: Market Research
• Sufficient number of qualified 
suppliers
• Sufficient suppliers attracted to 
your business
• Savings exceed e-RA transaction 
costs
• If lacking e-RA experience, add 
(minimal) lead time
• Availability of e-RA service 
providers
• Acceptance of online auctions by 
local culture
• All prospective bidders have 
reliable, secure internet access
Phase 3: Execution
• Personnel trained in e-RA use
 
Figure 2: eRA Appropriateness Model 
 
 
Price is an important factor for eRA 
appropriateness, but buyers can also 
evaluate non-price factors (e.g., delivery lead 
time, quality, warranty) using a multi-
attribute auction, as described later in this 
paper (Hawkins et al., 2009). The eRA ability 
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to evaluate both price-only and multi-
attribute evaluations allows their use for 
three out of four types of spend: non-critical 
(low criticality, low supply complexity), 
leverage (high criticality, low supply 
complexity), and bottleneck (low criticality, 
high supply complexity) (Beall et al., 2003; 
Kraljic, 1983). Generally, eRA’s are 
inappropriate for strategic spend where the 
high criticality and high supply complexity 
make partnerships and alliances more 
appropriate (Beall et al., 2003). 
 
Another reason for public manager interest 
in eRA appropriateness is confusion over 
when eRA use is appropriate and how the 
improper use of eRA’s may impact the buyer-
seller relationship. The concern is whether 
short-term savings outweigh potential long-
term consequences. Some view eRA’s as 
technology-assisted “power-based 
bargaining” techniques that create distrust 
and invite retaliatory pricing, or fail to 
account for the total ownership cost 
(Emiliani, 2004). Others fear long-term 
buyer-supplier relationship erosion (Jap, 
2003, 2007; Jap & Haruvy, 2008) because 
some suppliers feel buyers use the tool 
opportunistically (Jap, 2003) to squeeze 
supplier profit margins and overhead to a 
breaking point (Wagner and Schwab, 2004). 
 
Very little empirical research has found 
evidence of a causal link to relationship (Jap, 
2007) or performance degradation 
(Schoenherr and Mabert, 2007). In this case 
study, two no-cost modifications were 
negotiated, the contractor completed the 
work on time, and the government buyer was 
satisfied with the work. Nonetheless, it may 
be prudent for buyers to avoid using eRA’s 
where many post-award changes are 
anticipated since suppliers may capitalize on 
an opportunity to increase their profit 
margin. 
 
Methodology 
  
Case study research is particularly useful 
when researchers need to provide insight 
and depth to a unique phenomenon (Ellram, 
1996), such as wasta. We interviewed a 
broad range of participants including: the 
buyer, the prime offerors, one subcontractor, 
one firm that declined to participate in the 
eRA, the internal customer, the eRA service 
provider, and a U.S. government 
procurement official. The interview protocol 
was based upon archival review of 
contractual documents, the literature, and 
discussions with academic experts. 
 
Initial interviews with Kuwaiti eRA 
participants were held at their business 
locations by researchers familiar with the 
culture of both the buyer and suppliers. The 
researchers were able to observe non-verbal 
cues and to probe deeper into answers 
requiring more detail. Interviews lasting 45 
to 120 minutes were conducted in English; a 
total of 13 interviews were conducted, in 
keeping with reaching the theoretical 
saturation point of 10 to 30 interviews in 
qualitative research (Marshall, et al., 2013; 
Yin, 2009). The purpose of qualitative 
interviews is to achieve deep knowledge of a 
specific phenomenon rather than 
generalizability. Each interview was 
recorded then transcribed. Transcripts were 
sent to informants for an accuracy check, 
thereby enhancing construct validity (Flint et 
al., 2002; Yin, 2009). 
 
  
Analysis additionally included a review of 
archival data (Yin, 2009), including 58 e-
mails, 17 contractual documents, and several 
procurement policy letters. In addition to the 
interviews with Kuwaiti eRA participants, 
key informant insights occasioned from 
access to the military procurement unit 
commander as participant-observer. The unit 
commander actively directed the entire eRA 
process from initial determination to 
implementation of the eRA. He provided rare 
insights into the strategy development, 
motivation, and closed-door negotiations. His 
insights were combined with the other 
researchers’ insights in order to construct a 
comprehensive view of the eRA decision and 
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implementation process from multiple 
internal and external observer perspectives 
across multiple stakeholders. 
 
Applying the Public Value Framework to 
Procurement Innovation 
 
A U.S. military procurement unit in Kuwait 
identified the need for 29 standby power 
generators at forward-operating locations. 
The decision to use an eRA came from the 
unit commander after he reviewed the 
requirement, initial market research, and 
numerous discussions with the base civil 
engineer. The strategic triangle for public 
value describes the success factors for the 
commander to implement the new 
purchasing method. The active political 
debate and public outcry over Iraqi war 
expenditures provided a backdrop of implicit 
legitimacy and support for an innovative 
procurement method that saved money 
while meeting mission objectives; the timing 
was right to introduce the innovative 
procurement practice, if the commander 
could address the other two legs of the 
triangle: operational capacity and value. 
 
The operational capacity to implement the 
strategy reliant on eRA’s derived from the 
unit commander’s experience and knowledge 
of procurement in the DoD setting. The 
commander based the justification of the 
value of eRA’s to the unit mission based upon 
the three criteria for eRA appropriateness. 
First, the government pre-bid estimate (over 
$3M) made the tender attractive to suppliers. 
A sufficient number of attracted suppliers 
ensured adequate competition—a necessity 
for a successful eRA. Second, only five brands 
were determined to meet the government’s 
requirements, which made the requirement 
highly specifiable. Consequently, eRA 
appropriateness bolstered both value 
assertions and calls for legitimacy and 
support for eRA use. 
In February 2008, the procurement unit 
commander sent a notification of the 
impending event to 13 potential suppliers, 
along with a description of the eRA process 
as a condition of participation. Ten vendors 
responded with an interest to participate; 
nine ultimately submitted initial proposals to 
the government. Once the requirement was 
deemed appropriate for sourcing via eRA, the 
commander engaged Sorcity, a third-party 
eRA provider, to facilitate the eRA for a flat 
fee of approximately 3% of the pre-bid 
estimate, paid by the successful offeror after 
contract award. Sorcity provided the web-
based auctioning software application, 
auctioning expertise, and commodity and 
market expertise to facilitate an optimal eRA 
event. 
 
Proposals first had to meet “acceptable” 
technical standards in order to compete in 
the eRA based on: 1) technical approach, 2) 
management/technical support, 3) 
contractor’s quality control, 4) project 
schedule, and 5) past performance. After final 
proposal evaluations, the award would go to 
the lowest-priced, technically-acceptable 
offer as determined by the total price, 
defined as the overall price that the 
government ascertained as reasonable and 
complete. 
 
Timeline of eRA Execution 
 
In March 2008, the contracting officer 
determined five offerors to be technically 
acceptable and, therefore, eligible to 
participate in the eRA. On March 17, 2008, 
the U.S. military procurement unit conducted 
the eRA. Over the course of 278 bids, five 
vendors competed for nearly four hours 
before reaching the final price of $1,588,000. 
On March 18, the offeror submitting the 
lowest-priced, technically-acceptable offer 
received the award in accordance with the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation and the stated 
evaluation criteria in the request for 
quotations. Unsuccessful offerors received 
notifications and all participants attended 
debriefings. Savings totaled $395,000—a 
19.9% savings from the lowest proposed 
price received prior to the start of the 
auction. Consistent with the strategic 
triangle, procurement personnel were 
praised by the media (McCree, 2008) and 
their leadership for their innovative 
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approach that led to increased transparency 
and merit-based award selection. 
Transparency turned out to be perhaps the 
most appreciated consequence of eRA 
implementation among the supplier 
community. In a culture dominated by wasta, 
the suppliers enjoyed the clear-cut, merit-
based virtues of eRA’s. Rather than 
competing on intangibles and factors not 
directly relevant to the buy situation, 
suppliers enjoyed a rare opportunity to 
demonstrate acumen focused on the buy 
task. We discuss the importance of 
transparency to combat the downsides of 
wasta in further detail later. 
 
On April 5, 2008, the contractor, engineers, 
and contracting officer held a pre-
construction meeting and a site visit to 
discuss the timeline and logistics of the 
installation. On April 22, 2008, the 
government accepted the first delivery, 
accepting all but one generator that had 
minor damage to an exterior panel. On May 
18, 2008, the contracting officer held a 
meeting to discuss progress. The meeting 
identified several problems including 
government delays surrounding the 
contractor’s access to the installation, 
numerous changes to generator locations, 
and additional trenching and cabling that 
were needed. The negotiated changes led to a 
no-cost modification that extended the 
completion date from July 18, 2008 to August 
20, 2008. 
 
On May 29, 2008, the last generator was 
delivered and accepted by the government. 
Due to a number of generator location 
changes and site coordination issues, the 
government issued a second modification on 
August 20, 2008 that extended the period of 
performance to November 6, 2008. This 
modification de-scoped some concrete pads, 
switches and a fuel tank. It also added 
additional switches, cables, trenching, and 
weatherproof enclosures. These changes 
were signed as a bi-lateral, no-cost 
modification. 
 
On November 17, 2008, the contractor 
officially completed the project, signing a 
release of claims for 447,180.80 Kuwaiti 
dinars, the exact amount of the original eRA 
award price. Interviews with the contracting 
officer and civil engineer indicated that the 
contractor’s performance was satisfactory. In 
this instance, an eRA was an appropriate 
sourcing tool. 
 
Discussion 
 
Risks, Issues, and Obstacles 
 
Critics of eRA’s suggest that findings 
supporting per-unit-price reductions fail to 
take into account all of the costs that are 
incurred across the supply chain (Chen, 
Roundy, Zhang & Janakiraman, 2005) and, 
therefore, contend that the savings are 
overstated (Emiliani and Stec, 2002a, 2002b, 
2005; Emiliani and Stec, 2004). This risk can 
be mitigated by evaluating total costs of 
ownership in concert with eRA bid prices. 
Critics also contend that reverse auctions 
represent a fundamentally coercive use of 
buyer market power that undermines long-
term business success (Giampietro and 
Emiliani, 2007). This issue can be mitigated 
by applying the appropriateness criteria, that 
is, by using the eRA for non-critical and 
leverage types of spending where close 
supplier relationships are not as critical. 
 
This case demonstrated the insights of public 
value theory’s strategic triangle, specifically 
with regard to the importance of several 
factors in overcoming: (1) organizational 
resistance due to the risk of a bid protest that 
would slow delivery, (2) supply base 
resistance due to the obvious impact to 
revenues and profits, and (3) resource 
constraints. Organizational resistance was 
overcome with organizational capacity 
embodied in a procurement expert who 
knew the latest trends and technology in 
procurement. Operational capacity was 
abetted by legitimacy and support reinforced 
by a political environment characterized by a 
renewed drive to optimize efficiency and an 
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underlying disdain with inefficiency and 
waste in the public sector, resembling an 
idealized prioritization of the ultimate 
stakeholder’s interest (i.e., the taxpayer). The 
innovator used the construct of eRA 
appropriateness as a mechanism to 
demonstrate value to augment the legitimacy 
and support for his innovation from a 
coalition by influencing key stakeholders 
such as the organization that "owned" the 
budget, the executive leading engineering 
and procurement, and the accounting and 
finance department. The budget “owner” and 
the accounting and finance members of the 
team were won over by the value exhibited 
by the business case: the significant savings 
potential. The executive was won over by the 
risk reduction techniques. The buyer 
conducted extensive research on protestable 
infractions using eRA’s. The buyer was also 
careful to utilize streamlined procurement 
procedures that involved less stringent 
procedures, that is, less opportunity to 
commit a protestable infraction. 
 
After securing internal support, the 
innovator had to persuade the supply base—
a group that is quite vocal in their opposition 
to reverse auctions. The innovator 
accomplished this by aggregating demand 
(i.e., the number of generators) across 
multiple military installations thereby 
increasing the value of the business such that 
prospective suppliers were more attracted 
by the potential amount of revenue and 
profit rather than the profit margin (that is 
typically squeezed during an eRA). The 
innovator also recognized that a key 
attribute of the eRA—price transparency—
was highly desired by a supply base that 
often operated in a business climate of wasta. 
 
Finally, with no funding, the innovator had to 
secure the services of a third-party reverse 
auctioneer. To do so, the innovator applied a 
critical tenet of strategic purchasing: 
collecting market intelligence, in accordance 
with market orientation theory (Kohli and 
Jaworski, 1990). This theory depicts how 
performance results from how firms collect 
information regarding customer needs, 
disseminate the information within the firm, 
and use the information to adapt products 
and services to customer needs. Market 
intelligence revealed an eRA auctioneer that 
employed an uncommon business model 
where only the winning supplier pays the 
eRA auctioneer’s fee. 
 
Best Practices & Lessons Learned 
 
Government supply executives must 
recognize the value of individual and 
organizational learning with respect to eRA’s. 
Since knowledge management can yield 
additional savings, supply leaders should 
institute structure to capture, understand, 
disseminate, and store eRA knowledge. Often, 
this is achieved by creating an eRA center of 
excellence and by hiring a dedicated e-
sourcing manager who can develop mastery 
of auctioneer software, work with the 
auctioneer, evaluate auctioneer performance, 
assist commodity teams with eRA project 
management, report consolidated eRA 
results to executive leaders, assist in optimal 
eRA configuration, execute the eRA, and 
conduct buyer team and supplier team 
training. In contrast, an informal reliance on 
individual employees provides knowledge 
resident only in the memories of its agents, 
but memories are fallible and employees can 
shift jobs. 
 
It is important not to lose sight of the 
ultimate goal of sourcing: to secure a high-
performing, capable, acceptable-risk, reliable 
supplier who can perform at a reasonable 
total cost. An eRA can elicit a focus on price; 
buyers should resist this urge. After all, the 
eRA is but one tool that enhances certain 
dynamics of a procurement. In this vein, 
another lesson learned is the importance of 
conducting scrupulous market research. 
Since eRA success is largely measured by 
savings from prior-period spending, and 
since success hinges on the amount of 
competition, buyers must find the best-of-
class suppliers and attract many of them to 
compete. Buyers must also be able to clearly 
articulate all performance requirements so 
that suppliers’ offers can be compared and to 
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prevent post-award changes where suppliers 
may be motivated to “get well” when in a sole 
source situation (i.e., the contract holder). 
 
eRA’s in the International Setting 
 
Examining a successful eRA event in Kuwait, 
this research explains how the integrity of 
the eRA, coupled with trust in the buying 
organization’s use of the eRA, countered a 
unique phenomenon to the region: wasta. 
Before using the eRA’s, US government 
claims of transparent and fair procurement 
methods suffered the distorting effects of 
wasta in the local markets, leading many 
Kuwaiti suppliers to lose faith in the 
purchasing process as being no different 
from their prior situation based on wasta. 
Kuwaiti offerors perceived eRA’s to be 
advantageous enough to overcome their 
cultural predilection to avoid the uncertainty 
of a new procurement method, and to 
overcome the potential threat to profits. 
 
Based upon our experiences in Kuwait, an 
eRA can be an appropriate sourcing tool in 
the MENA region since suppliers were highly 
satisfied by the eRA’s inherent transparency 
and procedural fairness (Hawkins, et al., 
2014). Procedural fairness afforded suppliers 
the ability to compete on the merits of their 
quality and price (i.e., efficiency) rather than 
on social influence, power, and connections 
(i.e., wasta). These findings reinforce past 
findings regarding the important role of a 
transparent e-procurement process to 
combat corruption and improve cost 
effectiveness in international e-government 
procurement (Rotchanakitumnuai, 2013). 
 
In the context of wasta, the value of 
transparency and fairness can be an 
important cultural factor that attracted 
suppliers to participate in the eRA, and the 
experience left them satisfied ex-post – 
including firms that did not win the tender. 
Wasta ultimately contributed to the poor 
press perception of US government spending 
controls in the aftermath of the invasion of 
Iraq as government procurers initially 
reinforced previously established marketing 
regimes; eRA’s provided government 
managers with a demonstrable means of 
establishing merit-based fairness and 
transparency. This finding, coupled with slow 
eRA adoption in the government, raises the 
possibility that the value of transparency and 
fairness is an important cultural factor 
buttressing the economic rationale for eRA 
adoption.  
 
That eRA’s enhance transparency is nothing 
new (Beall et al., 2003). However, ERA’s have 
received criticisms as being unethical (Charki 
and Kosserand, 2008; Emiliani and Stec, 
2002a) due to a vacuum of fairness. Only by 
establishing trust in the buyer, trust in the 
buying process, and trust in the eRA service 
provider can the eRA be a sustainable 
procurement strategy in the region. We 
found that in the MENA culture, eRA’s can 
actually build trust. While some research of 
eRA use shows that suppliers’ suspicion of 
buyer opportunism could cast doubt on trust, 
and therefore could harm a buyer-supplier 
relationship (Jap, 2003), the severely 
negative effects of wasta were so loathed that 
suppliers craved an effective defense, to the 
point that even when they lost a tender they 
were satisfied. Furthermore, even when they 
win at unusually low margins, they are 
satisfied. This is in stark contrast to mature 
markets where suppliers are commonly 
bitter toward eRA use due to the perceptions 
of buyer opportunism and reduced margins 
in a perceived zero-sum bargain (Emiliani 
and Stec, 2005). 
 
Finally, eRA’s can be an effective sourcing 
tool in the MENA region, and buyers have 
much to gain by its use. Assuming one third 
of the $770 billion of merchandise trade 
(World Bank, 2008) is B2B commerce, and 
that 25 percent of total spending is 
appropriate for eRA’s (Hawkins  et al., 
2010b), a 20 percent savings would yield 
$38.5 billion. A drastic reduction in the costs 
of goods sold would render MENA buyers 
more competitive in a global market. 
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Opportunity 
 
The value of eRA’s to bolster transparency 
and fairness may not be unique to a wasta 
culture. Although U.S. public policy 
prescribes processes designed to instill 
transparency and fairness, prospective 
suppliers quite often suspect nefarious 
behavior among government acquisition 
teams.  Countless examples of favoritism and 
shirking rules to steer contract awards to 
“preferred” sources (Perlman, 2007) give 
“out-suppliers” reason for pause. For some 
acquisitions, this perceived inside advantage 
dissuades firms from competing (Curry, 
2010).  In such cases, an eRA may shed light 
on the relative positions of competing offers 
(either price point or relative price rank). 
 
For acquisitions utilizing the full multi-
attribute capability of eRA’s, the eRA can 
offer transparency into the evaluation of not 
only price but also non-price evaluation 
factors. Generally, multi-attribute bidding 
assigns weights to certain factors, such as 
price, delivery, and quality. These factors can 
be dynamically bid in real time where a 
composite score indicates the best value. For 
example, public agencies contracting for fleet 
vehicle spare parts could allow offerors to 
bid varying prices for faster delivery times 
and a longer warranty period. The supplier 
would determine performance levels 
(delivery time and warranty period) and bid 
commensurately. The buyer would 
determine the relative weights of the 
evaluation factors and, with the help of the 
auctioneer’s software, determine the 
computation of the composite best-value 
score. The offerors’ scores and price points 
could be revealed during the eRA bidding 
event yielding full transparency. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This case provides a framework for creating 
and implementing a strategy for 
procurement innovation based upon the 
public value theory strategic triangle 
framework in the specific context of 
implementing eRA’s at a military FOB. 
Additional contributions include the eRA 
appropriateness construct, insights regarding 
operating in the MENA culture, guidelines for 
managing risks, and some best-practice 
recommendations. In particular, eRA 
appropriateness provides a tool that 
addresses all three points of the strategic 
triangle. Public managers can easily re-
conceptualize this construct in different 
venues in order to further other procurement 
innovations. This versatile tool provides 
reinforcement to public managers seeking 
stakeholder acceptance to overcome 
entrenched cultural practices and resistance 
to change. As demonstrated in the Peruvian 
water boiling example (Rogers, 2010) and 
the city manager example (Wahid and Sein, 
2013), innovators must apply the tools of 
persuasion appropriate to the cultural milieu, 
keeping in mind that people implement (or 
impede) innovations. 
 
Although government is often cited as a 
laggard in adopting effective private 
practices, public managers should feel 
optimistic with regard to innovative 
electronic solutions. In many cases, 
government managers adopt electronic 
methods concurrently or even ahead of 
private businesses (Gates and Nissen, 2002). 
Although government adoption of eRA’s 
currently lags, exceptions exist. One example 
of a cutting edge innovative eRA occurs in 
human resource management where eRA’s 
have been used to develop non-monetary 
incentives to military personnel. Allowing 
personnel to use eRA’s to develop a semi-
customized incentive package increased 
satisfaction from less than 50% to 80% 
(Coughlin, Gates & Myung, 2013). This 
method has also been studied as an 
experiment to identify the optimal mix of 
monetary and non-monetary incentives for 
talent retention in the US Navy’s nursing 
corps (Levy, 2010). Looking forward, eRA’s 
could be extended to the optimal 
determination of monetary incentives in 
situations such as retention bonuses and, 
conversely, voluntary separation incentives. 
Individuals could bid on the monetary values 
that would either retain them or motivate 
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them to resign. The total cost across all 
individuals may be less than uniform, lump-
sum incentives. 
 
The diversity of these extensions highlights 
the versatility of an eRA as a source of 
continuing innovation. Additionally, this case 
could assist continued eRA diffusion in public 
and not-for-profit organizations’ 
procurements. While the eRA is not 
appropriate for every transaction, our 
analysis indicates that government buyers 
are leaving billions of dollars on the table by 
not incorporating eRA’s into larger 
acquisitions involving “non-critical” and 
“leverage” types of spend (Kraljic, 1983). 
Our analysis sends an important message: An 
eRA is a powerful tool that, if used 
appropriately, has the potential to increase 
transparency, competition, efficiency, and 
taxpayer savings. The practices provided 
herein are designed specifically to help 
buyers overcome structural barriers 
including training, organizational inertia, and 
a lack of eRA policy and guidance. 
Specifically, this guidance should help buyers 
select appropriate requirements, select eRA 
service providers, appropriately structure 
eRA’s for optimal savings, comply with 
procurement regulations, and mitigate risk. 
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